Electron App Penetration Testing
Security testing specialized for Electron desktop applications, where a web-grade XSS becomes desktop-grade remote code execution if the process model is misconfigured.
Selva Ops S.R.L.
Electron wraps your web application in Chromium plus Node.js. That combination collapses the usual browser security boundary: a cross-site scripting bug that would be a session-theft issue on the web can become remote code execution on the user’s desktop if the process model is misconfigured. Very few firms test this properly — most treat an Electron app as a website. It is not.
Electron-specific coverage
- Process model configuration —
nodeIntegration,contextIsolation,sandbox, andwebSecurityacross everyBrowserWindowandwebview, validated against Electron’s own security checklist. - IPC attack surface — every
ipcMainhandler andcontextBridgeAPI: what the renderer can ask the main process to do, with what validation, and what an attacker who gains renderer-context JavaScript execution can chain from it. - XSS-to-RCE chains — web-layer injection findings escalated through the Electron layer to demonstrate real desktop impact, not hypothetical severity.
- Navigation and window control —
will-navigate/setWindowOpenHandlerhandling,shell.openExternalwith attacker-influenced input. - Custom protocol handlers and deep links — OS-registered schemes as an unauthenticated entry path into the app.
- Update mechanism — signature validation in the updater, insecure feed URLs, downgrade attacks.
- Local data — what the app stores on disk (tokens, caches, logs) and how it is protected on shared machines.
Scope pairing
The web content inside the app is tested with full web application methodology; the Electron layer testing is added on top. If the app talks to your cloud APIs, those endpoints can be included as an API test.
What you receive
- A report with reproduction steps, evidence, and severity ratings for every finding
- A review of BrowserWindow/webPreferences configuration against Electron's security checklist
- IPC attack-surface mapping (main ⇄ renderer ⇄ preload)
- Remediation guidance for both web-layer and Electron-layer issues
- Retest of fixed findings and an updated report
Standards and references
Compliance context
FAQ
- Why does an Electron app need a specialized test?
- Because the impact model changes. In a browser, XSS steals a session; in a misconfigured Electron app, the same XSS reaches Node.js APIs and executes code on the user's machine. Testing must cover the Electron process model, not just the web content.
- We ship with contextIsolation enabled — are we fine?
- It is necessary, not sufficient. Preload scripts still expose bridges over contextBridge, and an over-broad bridge API (for example, exposing a generic 'invoke' passthrough) recreates the problem contextIsolation was meant to fix. The IPC surface has to be reviewed call by call.